Upstream information
Description
Gitsign is a keyless Sigstore to signing tool for Git commits with your a GitHub / OIDC identity. From 0.4.0 to before 0.15.0, CertVerifier.Verify() in pkg/git/verifier.go unconditionally dereferences certs[0] after sd.GetCertificates() without checking the slice length. A CMS/PKCS7 signed message with an empty certificate set is a structurally valid DER payload; GetCertificates() returns an empty slice with no error, causing an immediate index-out-of-range panic. On the gitsign --verify code path (the GPG-compatible mode invoked by git verify-commit), the panic is silently recovered by internal/io/streams.go's Wrap() function, which returns nil instead of an error. main.go then exits with code 0, causing exit-code-only verification callers to interpret the failed verification as success. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.15.0.SUSE information
Overall state of this security issue: Does not affect SUSE products
This issue is currently rated as having moderate severity.
| CVSS detail | CNA (GitHub) |
|---|---|
| Base Score | 5.4 |
| Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | Required |
| Scope | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality Impact | None |
| Integrity Impact | Low |
| Availability Impact | Low |
| CVSSv3 Version | 3.1 |
SUSE Timeline for this CVE
CVE page created: Fri May 15 20:02:02 2026CVE page last modified: Mon May 18 11:33:00 2026